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1. When an imperfectly granular input-based performance measure
is used initial contracts should be based on an extreme of the
value distribution. (Chapter 1)
2. Managerial supervision is an imperfect complement to the use
of objective performance measures. (Chapter 2)
3. Specialists have an edge in supervisory positions if objective per-
formance measures are used as well. (Chapter 2)
4. Short-term team incentives do not necessarily induce a more
efficient task assignment at the expense of alternative motives
for task assignment. (Chapter 3)
5. Students do best when they set their own goals. (Chapter 4)
6. It would be highly suspect if every experimental intervention
yielded significant effects.
7. If economics is the study of choice it could also be described as
the study of beliefs.
8. Conservatism is a byproduct of having obtained a reputation.
9. The problem with theory is that internal validity is soon mis-
taken for external validity.
10. The most underrated aspect of decision making is the time and
effort going into the decision making itself.
11. Hofstadters law (It always takes longer than you expect, even
when you take into account Hofstadter’s Law) is correct.
